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Security and Human Rights:
Finding a Language of
Resilience and Inclusion
LIORA LAZARUS AND BENJAMIN J GOOLD

S

ECURITY AND HUMAN Rights was first published in 2007, six years after the
events of 9/11. We argued then that liberal democracies, if they were to
withstand growing calls for exceptionalism, needed to find a way to reconcile the demands of security with a respect for fundamental human rights. With
the benefit of hindsight, and having witnessed the steady rise of populism over
the last ten years, this call now appears both prophetic and increasingly urgent.
Today there is little doubt that populism constitutes a central challenge to liberal democratic norms, preying as it does on existential fear while promoting
nationalist paranoia and stoking racial and religious division.1 In this ‘politics
of fear’, the threat of insecurity has been hyper-inflated and exploited to justify
a pernicious authoritarianism.2 It is against this backdrop that many academics,
policy actors, and human rights activists have found themselves vilified as outof-touch elitists or naïve experts and their calls for a thoughtful balance between
security and rights dismissed as mere ‘virtue-signalling’ rhetoric.
The threat of this security populism is now so profound that core values
of human rights, constitutionalism, and tolerance are under acute pressure
in democracies throughout the world. At the time of writing, the signs of
this pressure are all around us. The withdrawal of the United States from the

1 D Runciman, How Democracy Ends (London, Profile Books, 2018); Y Mounk, The People vs
Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save it (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2018); WA Galston, Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 2018); T Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America
(London, Bodley Head, 2018); S Levitsky and D Ziblatt, How Democracies Die: What History
Reveals about Our Future (London, Penguin Random House, 2018).
2 K Roth, ‘Twin Threats: How the Politics of Fear and the Crushing of Civil Society Imperil
Global Rights’ in Human Rights Watch (ed), Human Rights Watch World Report 2016, available at
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016 (accessed 15 March 2019).
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UN Human Rights Council, the support of the US Supreme Court for President
Donald Trump’s travel ban, the separation of children from their parents at the
US border, the purging of the Polish Constitutional Court, the undermining
of the rule of law and academic freedom in Hungary, Russia’s constitutional
amendment undermining the status of decisions from the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), the consolidation of emergency power in Turkey, the
continuing rejection by the Right in the United Kingdom of the legitimacy of
the European human rights regime, and the increasing political strength globally
of anti-immigrant and racist right-wing populism are only a few examples of
this dramatic and disturbing trend. Almost every day we hear news of another
executive action aimed at rolling back the human rights advances of the last half
century. As David Rieff has argued, ‘the global balance of power has tilted away
from governments committed to human rights norms and toward those indifferent or actively hostile to them.’3
There is no denying, however, that the erosion of fundamental rights and
the consolidation of executive power in pursuit of security took (and takes)
place under the watch of self-identified ‘liberal’ leaders. While the state of
emergency in France was initiated in 2015 after attacks in Paris, it continued for
six months after Emmanuel Macron came to power in 2017, and the issues of
emergency powers and lethal force have recently arisen again in response to the
gilets jaunes protests.4 Austria, France, Belgium, and Denmark have all banned
religious dress covering the face,5 while the US targeted killing programme
expanded significantly during the presidency of Barack Obama. The contradictions within ‘liberalism’, whether expressed through the pursuit of security at
the expense of rights or as a blunt ideological commitment to secularism, have
served only to exacerbate a pre-existing scepticism towards the liberal project
in countries across Europe and in the United States. These contradictions are
nothing new: the counternarratives of slavery and colonialism have long been
sublimated alongside celebrations of so-called liberal values.6 Defending
3D

Rieff, ‘The End of Human Rights? Learning from the Failure of the Responsibility to
Protect and the International Criminal Court’, Foreign Policy (9 April 2018), https://foreignpolicy.
com/2018/04/09/the-end-of-human-rights-genocide-united-nations-r2p-terrorism/. For discussion
of the effects of populism on liberal constitutional norms and democratic institutions, see a recent
special double issue of the German Law Journal (2019) 20(2&3); and T Ginsburg and AZ Huq,
How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2019).
4 G Koenig, ‘Emmanuel Macron is on a Slippery Slope towards “Democratic Despotism”’,
Financial Times (10 March 2019). See also News Wires, ‘UN Calls for Probe into “Excessive” Force
by French Police at Yellow Vests Protests’, France 24 (6 March 2019), https://www.france24.com/
en/20190306-un-france-investigate-excessive-force-yellow-vests. Regarding Europe more broadly,
see Amnesty International, ‘Dangerously Disproportionate: The Ever-Expanding National Security
State in Europe’, EUR 01/5342/2017 (17 January 2017).
5 See the further discussion below, as well as the chapter in this volume by Rumee Ahmed and
Ayesha S Chaudhry.
6 The whitewashing of European colonialism is the subject of the European Parliament Resolution
of 26 March 2019 on fundamental rights of people of African descent in Europe (2018/2899 RSP). See
also R Drayton, Whose Constitution? Law, Justice and History in the Caribbean, 6th Distinguished
Jurist Lecture (Port of Spain, Judicial Education Institute of Trinidad and Tobago, 2016); C Elkins,
Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York, Henry Holt, 2005).
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liberalism in the face of both its historical legacy and its more recent failure to
balance security with rights, remains a fundamental challenge for human rights
advocates.
In times of such pressure, there is a strong temptation to jettison human
rights, or even constitutionalism, as a failed paradigm,7 on the grounds that
it is little more than a liberal façade or a thin veil of legality behind which the
dirty work of security is carried out.8 As in the months immediately following
9/11, there are increasing signs that human rights proponents are experiencing profound self-doubt.9 During such moments, however, it is imperative for
those engaged in the promotion and protection of human rights to return to
fundamental values. While critical evaluation is essential and is certainly present
in this volume, it is also important to remind ourselves of what human rights
stand for, as well as the achievements of human rights and the constitutional
paradigm.
While many states continue to undermine human rights norms, their efforts
have thankfully been met with stubborn resistance, sometimes resulting in
successful appeals to justice. Recently, the UK Parliamentary Intelligence and
Security Committee published a report damning British intelligence agencies and the Foreign Secretary for their involvement in the torture and kidnap
of terrorist suspects after 9/11.10 This report is the most recent of a series of
inquiries across jurisdictions and institutions11 and key judicial decisions12
relating to the use of CIA-led torture and kidnapping as part of extraordinary

7 PJ Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2018). By ‘constitutionalism’ we mean a belief in constitutional government, or government limited by laws. See W Waluchow,
‘Constitutionalism’ in EN Zalta et al (eds), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford,
Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/constitutionalism/.
8 M Neocleous, ‘Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security Politics’ (2007) 6 Contemporary Political Theory 131–49.
9 Rieff (above n 3); and K Roth, ‘The Dangerous Rise of Populism: Global Attacks on Human
Rights Values’ in Human Rights Watch (ed), Human Rights Watch World Report 2017, available at
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017 (accessed 15 March 2019).
10 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (UK), ‘Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: Current Issues’ (2018, HC 1113), https://fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc-detainee2.pdf.
11 D Marty (Special Rapporteur), ‘Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving
Council of Europe Member States: Second Report’, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
report (7 June 2007), http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.
pdf; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (USA), ‘Committee Study of the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’, Senate Report 113–288 (9 December 2014), https://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf; Commission of
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar (‘Arar Commission’),
‘Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar’ (2006), available at http://publications.gc.ca/site/
eng/9.688875/publication.html. See also the chapter in this volume by Kent Roach.
12 El-Masri v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2013) 57 EHRR 25; Al Nashiri and
Husayn v Poland (2015) 60 EHRR 16; Nasr and Ghali v Italy (2016) ECHR 2010; Al Nashiri v
Romania (2018) App No 33234/12); Belhaj and Rahmatullah v Straw and Ministry of Defence
[2017] UKSC 3; Khaled El-Masri v United States, Inter-Am CHR Case 419.08, Report No 21/16
(15 April 2016). But see El-Masri v Tenet, 437 F Supp 2d 530, 539; and El-Masri v United States, 479
F3d 296, 300 (4th Cir 2007), cert denied, 552 US 947 (2007).
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rendition processes post-9/11. While exposure of these practices came far
too slowly for rendition victims, and impunity in respect of those actors who
committed torture remains a serious concern,13 there is little doubt that the
absolute prohibition on torture under international and domestic human rights
law played a part in this process and will continue to have ramifications for those
involved in the years to come.14 Similarly, protections against arbitrary detention
have enabled courts to gradually overturn laws that sought to allow for indefinite detention without trial in the United States and Britain in the wake of 9/11.
In many ways, the right to habeas corpus has grown in stature thanks to its role
in the dismantling of the early regimes at Guantanamo Bay and Belmarsh.15
Talk of a jus cogens status for the right against arbitrary detention is now even
being acknowledged in UK courts.16
On the other hand, some human rights protections have shown a disturbing
elasticity when confronted with novel security measures. Just as the right to a fair
trial has ‘adapted’ to allow for the admission of certain forms of secret evidence,17
privacy jurisprudence has shown considerable flexibility in the face of steady
expansions in state surveillance.18 Similarly, there has been a notable rise in the
use of immigration law as a weapon of counterterrorism, with citizenship deprivation at the most extreme end of these policies.19 Set outside the procedural
safeguards of the criminal law and the full jurisdictional protections of human
and constitutional rights, immigration law is a fertile ground for human rights
13 See

Joint Committee on Human Rights (UK), ‘Closing the Impunity Gap: UK Law on Genocide
(and Related Crimes) and Redress for Torture Victims’ (2008–09, HL 153 HC 553); and L Lazarus
and J Blackbourn, ‘Intelligence and the Criminal Law in England and Wales’ in M Dyson and
B Vogel (eds), The Limits of Criminal Law (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2018). But see recent movements toward greater accountability: O Bowcott, ‘Police Investigating Role of UK Officers in Torture
of al-Qaida Suspect’, Guardian (31 March 2019).
14 See the chapter in this volume by Natasa Mavronicola.
15 Rasul v Bush 542 US 466 (2004); Hamdi v Rumsfeld 542 US 507 (2004); Hamdan v Rumsfeld
548 US 557 (2006); Boumediene v Bush 553 US 723 (2008); and A v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2004] UKHL 56.
16 Belhaj v Straw and Rahmatullah v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 3, paras 270–71.
17 The accommodation process has been at its most evident within ECHR jurisprudence. See
E Nanopoulos, ‘European Human Rights and the Normalisation of the “Closed Material Procedure”: Limit or Source?’ (2015) 78(6) Modern Law Review 913–44; A v United Kingdom (2009)
49 EHRR 29; Sher v United Kingdom (2016) 63 EHRR 24; Al Dulimi v Switzerland (2016) 42 BHRC
163; and Home Secretary v AF [2009] UKHL 28. UK common law has shown itself to be more
resistant: Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34; and Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 1)
[2013] UKSC 38. For fair trial rights in the context of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, see the
chapter in this volume by Juan Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo.
18 See S Chesterman, ‘Terrorism, Surveillance, and Privacy’ in B Saul (ed), Research Handbook
on International Law and Terrorism (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2014). For a recent account of the
steady expansion in state surveillance, see D Lyon, The Culture of Surveillance (Cambridge, Polity
Press, 2018). See also the chapter in this volume by Arianna Vedaschi.
19 The recent deprivation of Shamima Begum’s citizenship and the death of her newborn baby
in a refugee camp shortly after this decision was made have raised widespread public criticism; the
decision is also the subject of a pending challenge. See V Dodd, ‘Shamima Begum Family Challenge
Javid’s Citizenship Decision’, Guardian (20 March 2019). See also the chapter in this volume by
Lucia Zedner.
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limitations, and courts have been alarmingly slow to intervene when individuals
have been left without the ‘protections of nationality’.20 Indeed, the tendency of
supposed liberal democracies to ‘export’ the dirty work of counterterrorism is
a major concern.21
Similarly concerning is the erosion of the right to life through the continued use of targeted killing programmes. Here the reach for legal justification
by democratic states, most notably Israel and the United States, has stretched
international law paradigms relating to armed conflict and the proportionality of lethal force.22 In this pursuit, President Obama did little to constrain
the executive power awarded to the Presidency by his hawkish predecessors.
Targeted killing, as with extraordinary rendition and indefinite detention, radically undermines any claim to the moral high ground by the United States and
its allies purporting to uphold ‘Western’ democratic values.23 The stain of this
programme remains indelible, especially as the victims’ families have had almost
no human rights recourse or vindication. Notwithstanding vocal condemnation
by human rights institutions such as the Special Rapporteurs and NGOs24 and
the recent condemnation of the North Rhine Westphalia Higher Administrative

20 L Zedner, ‘Citizenship Deprivation, Security and Human Rights’ (2016) 18(2) European Journal
of Migration and Law 222–42, 230.
21 The recent decision of the UK High Court in El Gizouli v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2019] EWC 60 (Admin) is a particularly egregious example of judicial deference in this
respect. The Court held that the Secretary of State was entitled to authorise mutual legal assistance
to the United States to assist in a criminal investigation that was likely to lead to the death penalty
upon conviction, without seeking any diplomatic assurances to the contrary.
22 See C Heyns, D Akande, L Hill-Cawthorne, and T Chengeta, ‘The International Law Framework
Regulating the Use of Armed Drones’ (2016) 65(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly
791–827; R Goodman, ‘Why the Laws of War Apply to Drone Strikes Outside “Areas of Active
Hostilities”: A Memo to the Human Rights Community’, Just Security (4 October 2017), https://
www.justsecurity.org/45613/laws-war-apply-drone-strikes-areas-active-hostilities-a-memohuman-rights-community; M Milanovic, ‘On Whether IHL Applies to Drone Strikes Outside
“Areas of Active Hostilities”: A Response to Ryan Goodman’, EJIL: Talk! (5 October 2017), https://
www.ejiltalk.org/on-whether-ihl-applies-to-drone-strikes-outside-areas-of-active-hostilitiesa-response-to-ryan-goodman; N Modirzadeh, ‘Reframing the Debate: A Response to Ryan
Goodman’s Memo to the Human Rights Community’, Lawfare (9 October 2017), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/reframing-debate-response-ryan-goodmans-memo-human-rights-community;
and S Bachmann, ‘Targetted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities’ (2013)
18(2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 259–88. See also the chapter in this volume by Shiri
Krebs.
23 L Lazarus, B Goold, and C Goss, ‘Control without Punishment: Understanding Coercion’ in
J Simon and R Sparks (eds), SAGE Handbook of Punishment and Society (London, Sage, 2013).
24 P Alston, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions:
Addendum’, Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (28 May 2010); B Emmerson,
‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’, UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/68/389 (18 September 2013);
B Emmerson, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/25/59
(11 March 2014); and C Heyns, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions’, UN General Assembly, UN doc A/68/382 (13 September 2013).
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Court on the legality of drone operations conducted in Germany,25 no effective
remedy is available to those communities that have lost innocent lives.26
Along with the erosion of fundamental rights across the globe, there has
been a corresponding movement to make security the object of human rights
protections. National security concerns, once seen in tension with fundamental
rights, have come to be embodied within new ‘coercive human rights’, which
centre on the protective obligations of states in relation to victims or potential victims of private violence – rather than being understood as a limitation
on state action.27 The turn to security from within human rights discourse is
indicative of a broader shift towards securitisation, whereby even the concept
of the rule of law and the ambition of economic development are seen as mere
preconditions to the security of individuals rather than as substantive goods in
themselves.28 While two decades ago we might have referred to a ‘right to food’
we now speak of ‘food security’; while the ‘rule of law’ used to refer to the
absence of arbitrary state power, it is now gradually being replaced by ‘security,
law, and order’ rhetoric.29
This shift towards protection or coercion can be viewed in a variety of ways.
On the one hand, it can be argued that this move runs counter to the ever-growing
perception or caricature that human rights and the rule of law limit the pursuit
of order and security; and the elision of human rights with security is an appropriate response to the increasing threat of private violence. On the other hand,
it also signals the corrosive influence of security politics within international
political discourse. Ultimately, what these trends signal is the capacity of human

25 The

Court concluded that ‘the German Federal Government’s present assumption that there are
no indications of violations of German or international law by the USA through the USA’s activities in Germany is based on an insufficient investigation of the facts and is ultimately not legally
sustainable.’ Faisal bin Ali Jaber and Others v the Federal Republic of Germany, North Rhine-Westphalia Higher Administrative Court, 4 A 1361/15 (19 March 2019), https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/
Juristische_Dokumente/OVG_Muenster_oral_declaration_of_judgment_19_March_2019_EN.pdf
(translation).
26 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Amnesty International et al, ‘Joint Letter to
President Obama on US Drone Strikes and Targeted Killings’ (11 April 2013), available at https://
www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/11/joint-letter-president-obama-us-drone-strikes-and-targeted-killings
(accessed 20 March 2019). See also the Human Rights Watch webpage on ‘Targeted Killings and
Drones’, https://www.hrw.org/topic/terrorism-counterterrorism/targeted-killings-and-drones (accessed
20 March 2019).
27 L Lazarus, ‘Positive Obligations and Criminal Justice: Duties to Protect or Coerce?’ in J Roberts
and L Zedner (eds), Principled Approaches to Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour
of Professor Andrew Ashworth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012); L Lavrysen, ‘Human Rights
in a Positive State: Rethinking the Relationship between Positive and Negative Obligations under
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2016); and N Mavronicola,
‘Taking Life and Liberty Seriously: Reconsidering Criminal Liability under Article 2 of the ECHR’
(2017) 80(6) Modern Law Review 1026–51.
28 L Lazarus, ‘The Right to Security: Securing Rights or Securitising Rights?’ in R Dickinson,
E Katselli, C Murray, and OW Pedersen (eds), Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); and L Lazarus, ‘Doing Violence to the Rule of Law’
(April 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3170649 (accessed 20 March 2019).
29 Lazarus, ‘Doing Violence to the Rule of Law’ (ibid).
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rights to be co-opted and transformed by national and international narratives
about security. The adaptability of rights discourse may be both its most significant protection and its most dangerous threat.
While human rights have shown themselves both adaptable and vulnerable
to the pressures associated with the pursuit of security, the landscape of security
has also evolved significantly since the first edition of this book, with many of
the ‘threats’ targeted by hawkish states showing signs of persistence and intractability. There is little doubt that security interventions and rights violations have
themselves helped to entrench the very threats to security that states have sought
to counter: one need only look at the rise of ISIS after the illegal invasion of Iraq
to find a clear example of how security overreach can undermine its stated objective. The cycle of terrorism has thus continued, with fatalities rising globally.30
In the Global North, the response to recent terrorist attacks has been
complex. Despite encouraging signs that the centrist public is growing tired of
securitised rhetoric and instead turning to discourses of resilience,31 terrorism
in some metropolitan cities in Europe has resulted in the application of emergency conditions32 and led to a surge in Islamophobic rhetoric and violence.33
The uneven nature of political reactions and media treatment of different types
of violence and aggression has itself become a point of contention.34 Certainly,
the immediate and unequivocal labelling of the Christchurch mosque massacres
as ‘terrorism’ by New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Adern stood in sharp
contrast to the denialism of President Donald Trump when he has been queried
about the actions of white supremacists and other right-wing extremists. In many
ways, the manner in which security threats are named and explained has now
become a conscious political marker in an increasingly polarised environment.
One clear point we can draw from the last decade is that governments that
suggest they can ‘end’ insecurity, ‘terminate’ threats, or ‘bring this carnage to
an end today’ are unlikely ever to deliver on their promises.35 Far more likely is

30 Data

shows that after 2007, fatalities from terrorist attacks globally were in decline, but this
trend was sharply reversed in 2010, after which fatalities rose from 7727 to 43,566. By far the greatest number of terrorism-related fatalities have occurred in Iraq (13,000 in 2014 and 12,187 in 2016)
and Afghanistan (6,119 in 2016). M Roser, M Nagdy, and H Ritchie, ‘Terrorism’, OurWorldInData
website (January 2018), https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism.
31 S Jenkins, ‘Media Hype about the Westminster Attacks Will Only Encourage Others’, Guardian (24 March 2017); and S Jenkins, ‘How Our Politicians and Media Are Helping Terrorists Win’,
Spectator (9 April 2016).
32 See the chapter in this volume by Marc-Antoine Granger.
33 S Marsh, ‘Record Number of Anti-Muslim Attacks Reported in UK Last Year’, Guardian
(20 July 2018). See also chapters in this volume by Aziz Z Huq; and Rumee Ahmed and Ayesha
S Chaudhry.
34 A Serwer, ‘The Terrorism that Doesn’t Spark a Panic’, Atlantic (28 January 2019); A Batrawy,
‘Is it Terrorism? Post-NZ Attack, Muslims See Double Standard’, Washington Post (24 March 2019).
See also interview with Ayesha Chaudhry, CTV News (15 March 2019), available at https://www.
ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=1637407 (accessed 27 March 2019).
35 D Trump, ‘Inaugural Address’, White House (20 January 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address.
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that such governments will play the politics of security, just as they have always
done, to shore up their own political power. This security populism, which is
premised on the vilification of outsider groups and has increasingly relied on
systemic Islamophobia, is now showing its real face. Instead of more security,
right-wing terrorism has risen, with devastating effects.36 While the shock of
the recent attacks in Christchurch is still reverberating around the globe, rightwing terrorist violence has also occurred over the last three years in Quebec,
Ajaccio, Munich, Dresden, Duma, Zurich, London, Portland, Jefferstown, and
Pittsburgh. These are only a few examples of a clear trend that also encompasses
increasingly open expressions of anti-semitism. As the Anti-Defamation League
has reported in the context of the United States, ‘extremist-related murders in
2018 were overwhelmingly linked to right-wing extremists’.37 As a consequence,
there have been signs that such threats are now on the radar of counterterrorism
efforts in the United States and elsewhere.38
As the years since 9/11 have repeatedly shown, the claim that greater security can be achieved if we are willing to accept an erosion of rights is clearly
false. Yet human rights and security continue to be placed in opposition to one
another, as proponents of both rights and security are repeatedly drawn into
the interstices of an intractable campaign against a permanent threat. In this
complex and interrelated world, human rights are increasingly tested by populists who both grossly underplay the gains to be made by safeguarding human
rights and seriously underestimate the harms to security that result from their
breach. Similarly, the inevitably of risk in a free and globalised society has been
downplayed in favour of unrealistic claims about achieving security in order to
justify nationalism and autarchism, which in turn are inherently connected to
the vilification of others.
Balancing security and human rights will thus require a compelling counternarrative that appeals to the values of inclusion, resilience, and realism, and
recognises that risk is the unavoidable concomitant of freedom. The case must
be made, clearly and widely, that human rights are capable of accommodating
security pursuits while simultaneously requiring security pursuits to be necessary, realistic, grounded in the particularities of the local contexts in which they
are placed, and sensitive to the lived realities of those whose rights are engaged.
In this way, human rights can constitute a moderating framework in which resilient and tolerant societies can survive and thrive.
36 J Cassidy, ‘It’s Time to Confront the Threat of Right-Wing Terrorism’, New Yorker (16 March
2019); and J Freedland and M Hasan, ‘Muslims and Jews Face a Common Threat from White
Supremacists. We Must Fight It Together’, Guardian (3 April 2019).
37 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), ‘Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018’ (January
2019), https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2018.
38 C Hawkins, ‘Counter-Terrorism Operations against Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe
Increase 191% in 24 Months’, IHS Markit (7 December 2018), https://ihsmarkit.com/researchanalysis/counterterrorism-operations-against-right-wing-extremism.html; D Sandford, ‘Far-Right
Terror Threat “Growing” in UK as Four Plots Foiled’, BBC (26 February 2018); BBC, ‘Far-Right
Groups Could Exploit Brexit Tensions – Police’, BBC News (23 January 2019); and W Cai and
S Landon, ‘Attacks by White Extremists are Growing. So Are Their Connections’, New York Times
(3 April 2019).
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I. IDENTITY, RELIGION, AND CITIZENSHIP

Shortly after 9/11, Jeremy Waldron warned that the common image of balancing rights and security sublimates a pernicious distributive bias.39 His instincts
that the rights of marginalised minorities would be traded off in favour of the
interests of the homogenous majority have since been vindicated. In many
senses, the challenge for human rights defenders today is how best to confront
the asymmetrical impact of rights-limiting ‘emergency’ measures, as well as the
ways in which security populism has associated human rights with the protection of vilified ‘outsider’ groups.
It is telling that in the years since the first edition of Security and Human
Rights was published, issues of identity, religion, and citizenship have moved to the
forefront of discussions about security and rights, as more and more examples of the
trade-off Waldron warned of have become reality. Put simply, matters of identity –
be they religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, national, sexual, or gender – have now
become inexorably linked with assessments of risk, calls for increasingly intrusive
state surveillance, and demands for institutional discrimination and exclusion.
Perhaps even more seriously, in the ongoing rhetorical assault on human rights, the
linking of identity with security has become an accepted part of mainstream debates
about the future of rights, as the scapegoating and othering of key groups, most
notably Muslim and migrant communities, have become increasingly normalised.
In Part I of this book, we see an effort to grapple with these issues. While
some of the authors question whether individualised and supposedly ‘neutral’
human rights reasoning is capable of confronting the broader systemic inequalities in the distribution of coercive power, together the chapters make clear that
the dialectic between security and rights must be expanded to include a recognition of the inextricable links with wider social and personal processes of identity
formation and contestation.
In her chapter, Natasa Mavronicola identifies the moral wrong of torture
in the radical othering that it entails and compounds, and situates it within the
‘othering continuum’, which poses an existential threat to human rights more
broadly. Building on existing accounts for the absolute prohibition of torture as
‘the archetype of the human rights edifice’ and as an affront to human dignity,
Mavronicola confronts the gap between the absolute prohibition of torture in
law and moral theory and its continuing prevalence in practice. Pointing to the
othering behaviour that populists such as Trump use to demarcate ‘the border
of humanity’, Mavronicola argues that this practice ‘both drives and is central
to the act of torture’ and in turn ‘lies on a continuum with other ways in which
the essence of human rights is undermined in the name of security’. Torture, for
Mavronicola, is thus an extreme case of the more ‘banal’ or ‘acceptable mechanics
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and expressions of othering that pervade counterterrorism’. This broader othering narrative is ‘not only incidental but integral to the “trade-off ” underpinning
the pursuit of security at the expense of human rights’. For Mavronicola, much
of the crisis of faith in human rights that has consequently ensued is thus not a
rejection of the merits of human rights themselves but rather a rejection of ‘the
human rights of others’. She concludes by arguing that rather than a pragmatic
move to condone the distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘underserving’ rightsbearers, this threat to human rights can be met only by a profound reaffirmation
of human dignity and by respecting a dynamic integrity of law.
This concern with the implications of ‘othering’ for the protection of minority rights also lies at the heart of the next two chapters. Taking the burkini and
efforts to ban it in parts of Austria, France, and Germany as their starting point,
Rumee Ahmed and Ayesha S Chaudhry examine the ways in which rights and
security narratives have been deployed in relation to Muslim women. Depicted
in both religious and secular contexts as ‘non-ideal females’, Muslim women are
frequently portrayed as a threat to the security of ‘ideal citizens’ – in Western
democratic states as well as in religious autocracies like Afghanistan, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia. As such, the regulation of their appearance and dress is a focal
point not just for religious extremists. As Ahmed and Chaudhry demonstrate,
it has also become a flashpoint for likewise extremist secular discourses that
‘weaponise’ the language of human rights. This unwillingness to see Islam in
anything other than reductive terms, coupled with a denial of the fact that
Muslim women can maintain multiple identities that cut across religious and
secular boundaries, has led to efforts to ban the burkini and thus to criminalise
the choices of an already marginalised group. More significantly, Ahmed and
Chaudhry argue, rather than being recognised as holders of rights that should
protect them, Muslim women are constructed as a threat to other citizens,
becoming the object of state policing instead.
Echoing some of the themes explored by Ahmed and Chaudhry, Aziz Huq
in his chapter looks at how conceptions of Islam and the Muslim influence the
development and application of counterterrorism laws and policies. While Islam
and Muslim identity are frequently used as ‘criteria of suspicion’ in the context
of counterterrorism, Huq argues that these concepts are mobilised in variety of
other, often less obvious ways. In particular, aspects of Islam and Muslim identity are deliberately singled out in public debates with a view to juxtaposing ‘the
moral legitimacy of the liberal state with the perceived normative bankruptcy of
Islam’. As Huq rightly notes, counterterrorism policies that target Muslims not
only have consequences for the promotion and protection of individual rights
but also raise questions of distributive justice. Observing that ‘the costs of security are borne by Muslims’ – not only in the form of stigma and private violence
but also in terms of ‘economic exclusion’ – Huq draws our attention to the
ways in which the pursuit of security has exacerbated and entrenched existing
forms of anti-Muslim discrimination. Although he notes in his conclusion that
Muslim civil society organisations have begun to resist the steady securitisation
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of Islam, given the law’s inability to curb the worst excesses of security, Huq is
pessimistic about the future, especially if the political landscapes of Europe and
the United States continue to be dominated by right-wing populists.
In the next chapter, Lucia Zedner turns to another aspect of identity that
has been transformed in the years since 9/11, namely citizenship. She focuses in
particular on the mobility rights that citizenship entails and the ways they have
been transformed by terrorism and the pursuit of security. Harking back to her
chapter in the first edition of Security and Human Rights, which explored how
preventive measures implemented in the wake of 9/11 had eroded fundamental
rights and due process protections, Zedner argues here that efforts to limit the
citizenship rights of individuals held to be ‘enemies of the state’ represent an
even greater challenge to our commitment to fundamental rights. Noting that
in some cases these measures have the potential to leave individuals stateless,
Zedner contends that ‘the rights enjoyed by all citizens are today more precarious and their protection less secure’. In this regard, she echoes the concerns
of many of the other contributors to this volume: namely, that the relentless
drive towards ever-more restrictive security measures has transformed the way
we think about what were once stable ideas of national identity and citizenship, with the result that we now live in a world that in which human rights are
increasingly denied to those deemed to be a threat by the state.
Changing conceptions of citizenship, particularly at the border, are also the
focus of Benjamin Goold’s chapter. Using ‘trusted traveller’ schemes such as the
UK Registered Traveller Service and the US–Canada NEXUS programme as a
point of focus, Goold invites us to think about the ways in which we are encouraged by the state to accept and internalise new forms of identity that do not rely
merely on the traditional citizen/noncitizen binary. Under the aegis of ‘security’
but also in exchange for convenience and privilege at the border, many states
have induced travellers to hand over large amounts of personal information in
order to join the ranks of a new class that is deemed ‘safe’ or ‘trusted’. Drawing
on research that sees borders as sites of social sorting, Goold highlights how
the proliferation of such programmes enables ‘trusted travellers’ to maintain a
range of existing privileges that centre around race, ethnicity, language, education, and socioeconomic status and mirror those that perpetuate inequalities
well beyond the border. The foil of these ‘trusted travellers’ is simultaneously
constructed as groups of ‘undesirable’ or ‘high-risk’ travellers, whose plight is
more easily dismissed by those who can take advantage of (and pay for) streamlined security and ‘fast-track’ immigration procedures. As Goold points out, this
process of social sorting has been swept up into a wider neoliberal narrative that
casts ‘trusted travellers’ as good consumer-citizens but downplays the lack of
status and mobility of others. Goold therefore concludes that the emergence of
‘trusted traveller’ schemes does not simply pose a danger to individual privacy;
such programmes also risk exacerbating existing forms of discrimination and
contributing to a fractured politics that sees questions of security and immigration only in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’.
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II. RIGHTS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE STATE

Rights are traditionally understood to be held by individuals to protect them
from the overweening power of the state. Yet the covertness surrounding most
national security endeavours makes it difficult for courts, lawyers, legal academics, and journalists to access even basic information about the surveillance and
counterterrorism activities of governments, and even more difficult to determine
whether such activities are being carried out in a manner that is consistent with
domestic and international law. Given the scope that modern states have for
intruding into the lives of their citizens and the insulation from critical scrutiny that can result from state secrecy doctrines, the question of what it means
to hold a state accountable for transgressions inevitably animates many of the
chapters in this collection.
In the face of consistent efforts by states to keep their activities secret, Liora
Lazarus argues in her chapter for a principle of retrospective accountability.
Noting that academics must recognise the critical role they play in holding
knowledge accountable, she contends that legal academics in particular have
responsibilities to the rule of law that are fundamentally challenged by state
secrecy. Drawing on David Pozen’s categories of ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ secrets,
Lazarus points out the ways that both kinds of secrecy undermine the capacity
of legal scholars to evaluate legal proceedings and state activities, thus preventing them from fulfilling one of their core functions as dialogic participants
in the creation of law. According to Lazarus, the solution lies in part with a
consideration of the temporality of both academic scrutiny and legal accountability. While it may take many years to unravel the secrets surrounding sensitive
government activities such as counterterrorism operations, it is essential that
academics impose a degree of retrospective accountability. Drawing on the right
to truth and the principle of open justice in developing principles of retrospective accountability, Lazarus argues that academics have a role to play in ensuring
that governments are subject to scrutiny in the future. By making it clear to
state officials and judges that secret decisions can and will be scrutinised later, a
system of future scrutiny would thus serve both scholarship and the rule of law.
For Kent Roach, a challenge arises from a lack of agreement about what
exactly it means to hold states and governments to account. As Roach notes, if
we take a narrow view of the meaning of accountability and confine ourselves to
a focus on ‘control, sanction, and redress’, it is hard not to be disheartened by the
failure of courts and legislative bodies to punish state actors for human rights
abuses arising from extraordinary rendition, detention and torture at secret prisons, and other transnational counterterrorism measures. If, however, we take a
broader view of accountability – one that encompasses the various efforts of
the media, civil society, and academics to expose rights violations arising from
the pursuit of security – then the picture is less bleak. While Roach acknowledges that much of what we have learned about the security activities of states
since 9/11 has come from whistleblowers and investigative journalists – and
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that the flow of such information is precarious and unsteady – the combined
efforts of state and non-state actors have ensured at least a limited degree of
accountability over the last fifteen years.
Notwithstanding these opportunities for optimism, it is increasingly apparent that rights as a limit on state power are under attack. Both Victor Ramraj
and Robert Diab observe in their respective chapters that there are reasons to
worry that the collective commitment to rights – both in terms of the interests
they seek to protect and their legal status – has been significantly eroded in
recent years. For Ramraj, human rights have come under particular assault from
the rising tide of nationalism in many liberal democratic states. He points out
the ways that this nationalism both privileges national security over the interests
of vulnerable groups such as refugees and asylum seekers and is hostile to the
role played by international institutions such as the ECtHR, the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU), and the UN Security Council.
In contrast, Diab argues that one of the challenges for rights comes from the
fact that their status has come to be widely questioned in an era when the threat
of mass terrorism looms large in the public and political imagination. He traces
the evolution of the notion of rights as trumps since Ronald Dworkin first formulated it in 1970’s and notes especially the changes that occurred in the security
and human rights debate after 9/11. According to Diab, that watershed event not
only led many to question the value of rights but also prompted a reimagining
of the idea of (in)security. While rights may have, in principle at least, retained
their status as trumps in most liberal democracies, security has also acquired
something akin to a trump status. While Roach and Ramraj suggest that there
are reasons to be optimistic about the future of rights, in large part due to the
growing role of non-state actors in the promotion and protection of such rights,
Diab is less positive. We have, he argues, reached a critical impasse in the history
of human rights, during which fears of mass terror dominate news cycles and
political debates, and the currency of rights has been significantly devalued.
If we are to find our way out of the crisis identified by Diab, one possible
approach may lie with a re-examination of our idea of rights and their relationship to notions of the political. As Chetan Bhatt notes, at the heart of liberal
conceptions of the relationship between security and rights are assumptions
about the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence. Although
Hobbes is rarely evoked in contemporary discussions of security, his ideas about
the state of nature, sovereign power, and the economy of fear continue to inform
the ways in which we talk about the limits of the state. For Bhatt, it is important
to remember that threats to sovereign power – and to the life of the state –
are forbidden in the Hobbesian conception of the state because they raise the
prospect of a descent into civil war and chaos. Looked at in this way, it becomes
clear that the challenge of reconciling a commitment to rights with the reality of
state violence (against its own citizens as well as against those on the ‘outside’) is
hardly new. Indeed, Bhatt suggests that far from being oppositional, security and
rights are deeply intertwined: their relationship reflects ‘a deeper relationship
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between politics and violence’ that lies at the heart of the liberal state. While
Locke and his successors may have succeeded in expanding the liberal conception
of rights – and at the same time helped to define the boundaries of the state –
the Hobbesian-inspired fear of the state of nature continues to underpin many
of the arguments that privilege security over rights.
III. PRIVACY, ANONYMITY, AND DISSENT

Since the publication of the first edition of Security and Human Rights, where
Goold warned about the potential of surveillance to reconstitute the relationship between individuals and the state, there has been an exponential increase
in the use of sophisticated and (often secret) surveillance technologies by (and
between) governments around the world. Although the steady expansion of
mass surveillance, communications monitoring, and data collection since 9/11
has long worried privacy activists, academics, and journalists, recent disclosures
of secret surveillance mechanisms operating transnationally have also resulted
in more widespread public outcries about the intrusiveness of state surveillance.
What do we risk each time we hand new surveillance powers to the state in the
name of security? For Arianna Vedaschi, the key to answering these questions lies
with our understanding of privacy and the legal structures that exist to protect it.
In her chapter, she reflects on how the CJEU has approached the difficult task
of balancing a commitment to privacy with the ongoing efforts of EU Member
States to expand their electronic surveillance and data collection capacities.
As she points out, the Court clearly accepts that national governments have a
legitimate interest in collecting and retaining certain types of electronic data
for the purposes of combatting terrorism, but it has affirmed that such activity
must also be proportionate and subject to meaningful procedural safeguards.
By both invalidating the former Data Retention Directive and declaring the US
Safe Harbour Agreement inconsistent with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Court sent a clear message
to Member States that privacy rights must be taken seriously.40 Yet as Vedaschi
notes, recent efforts by the United Kingdom and France suggest that some states
have continued to try to minimise their obligations under the Convention by
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developing increasingly intrusive mechanisms of data collection and retention.
While Vedaschi suggests that national courts and legislatures should commit
themselves to the privacy principles that underlie the recent decisions of the
CJEU, it remains to be seen whether EU states will continue to collect, process,
and share large amounts of personal data in the name of security.41
While Vedaschi focuses on judicial efforts to protect the privacy of citizens
from state surveillance, in his chapter, Juan Pablo Pérez-León-Acevedo considers
the ways in which anonymity has been used by courts to protect the identity of
victims and witnesses. Focusing on the proceedings for Ayyash et al at the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),42 he develops a framework for the reconciliation of
the right to anonymity of victims/witnesses and the rights of defendants within
international criminal processes based on ‘contextual and particular personal
circumstances’, human rights standards, national and international criminal law
standards, and ‘practical considerations’. Emphasising the importance within
international criminal justice of the determination of truth and the establishment of historical record, he questions the complete and pre-emptive exclusion
of anonymous victim participants (as opposed to witnesses) at the STL. While
recognising the inadmissibility of ‘anonymous witnesses’ as a necessary safeguard of fair trial rights of the accused, Pérez-León-Acevedo further suggests that
additional and alternative measures may be introduced to reconcile the opposing
interests of fair trial rights and witness security. As he demonstrates, the unique
status of the STL, means that the Tribunal’s ongoing attempts in Ayyash et al
to achieve this balance between the security rights of victim/witnesses and the
fair trial rights of defendants may become an influential source for national and
international courts when dealing with terrorism-related cases.
Criminal law is also the subject of analysis for the next two chapters, but the
authors shift focus by highlighting some of the ways that states have employed
the authority of the criminal law as a means of indirectly supressing public
debate and political dissent while ostensibly aiming to combat terrorism. Ben
Saul details the ways in which overly broad and vague counterterrorism laws
have been used to criminalise political resistance and substantially reduce the
possibility of even nonviolent protest in many countries. Central to Saul’s analysis is the observation that some states, despite warnings from international
41 Despite
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bodies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have
substantially expanded their domestic definitions of terrorism. Saul is especially
concerned by the use of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a means of
justifying these increasingly restrictive counterterrorism laws and legitimising
efforts to apply such laws extraterritorially. He notes that while the diminishment of unregulated space for political resistance is unevenly experienced across
jurisdictions, it in many cases leads to stigmatisation and criminalisation of all
forms of resistance as ‘terrorism’ and, more fundamentally, can be seen as part
of a ‘mutual transnational consolidation of state authority’.
Echoing some of the themes that are central to Saul’s chapter, Helen Duffy
and Kate Pitcher likewise raise an alarm regarding what they describe as a
‘global trend’ towards the criminalisation of the expression of ideas. They
survey a proliferation of ‘expansive offences’ that are enforced across a range
of international, regional, and national jurisdictions, against individuals who
share or make available ideas and opinions deemed ‘dangerous to society’. As
Duffy and Pitcher point out, it is not only direct incitement, instigation, and
inducement to violence offences that have been criminalised; recent prosecutions have employed indirect incitement offences that include even speech acts
which have no aim of supporting acts of violence. Such moves run counter to the
well-established criminal law principles of harm and remoteness, as well as the
basic rule-of-law requirements of necessity, proportionality, and foreseeability.
While a turn to criminal law might be welcomed as an antidote to the exceptionalist tendency to ‘define out’ terrorism and hence as a means of bringing
state counterterrorism into the fold of criminal law restraints on state overreach,
Duffy and Pitcher rightly ask how far the criminal law can stretch in pursuit
of terrorism prevention. Drawing together criminal principles and international
human rights standards, the authors advocate for coherent and consistent guidance from international courts on the issue of freedom of expression and the
ultima ratio basis of the criminal law as a preventive tool.
IV. EXCEPTIONALISM, RISK, AND PREVENTION

In the first edition of Security and Human Rights, we pointed to the rise of
a global culture of exceptionalism, most notably in jurisdictions with avowed
commitments to human rights and constitutionalism. Many of the scholars in
that volume sought to grapple with the question of how the rule of law could
be reconciled with claims to exceptional powers within a state of emergency.43

43 See in particular D Dyzenhaus and M Hunt, ‘Deference, Security and Human Rights’ in
BJ Goold and L Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights, 1st edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007);
and VV Ramraj, ‘Between Idealism and Pragmatism: Legal and Political Constraints on State Power
in Times of Crisis’ in BJ Goold and L Lazarus (eds) (above).
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At the time, a key issue was whether courts could oversee the use of derogations
or states of emergency and whether these powers could be reconciled with a
culture of justification rather than simply lending extraordinary powers a ‘veneer
of legality’.
Twelve years later, the debate surrounding the role of the judiciary in emergency conditions continues, evolving through richer, and often contradictory,
experience. Some senior members of the judiciary showed themselves to be
capable of facing down the most extreme emergency measures of the early years
post-9/11, with the UK Belmarsh case and US Boumediene case becoming yardsticks for upholding a basic minimum of rights guarantees in the face of state
claims to exceptionalism. In many ways, however, these decisions sit in stark
contrast with a number of other judgments that have allowed for the accommodation of counterterrorism measures within the normal frameworks of human
right law.44
Amidst the global intensification of security challenges, the judicialisation
of emergencies has proven to be a crucial development. No jurisdiction is more
central to this discussion than France, which returned to the use of emergency
powers for two years after Paris suffered terrorist attacks in November 2015. The
chapter by Marc Antoine Granger is a granular analysis of the judicial and nonjudicial oversight frameworks which applied during that time. Granger explains
that while administrative courts have some attenuated powers to review declarations and extensions of the state of emergency, their ‘actual capacity to rule
on these highly political decisions is questionable’. Far more powerful are the
extensive judicial powers to review and control administrative measures adopted
as part of the state of emergency, which included powers to order home searches
and raids anywhere and at any time, powers to limit freedom of movement of
people and vehicles, powers of house arrest, and powers of temporary closure
of theatres pubs and meeting places. Alongside judicial mechanisms, Granger
points to the success of parliamentary controls through the activity of Parliamentary Law Commissions and the Rights Defender which has proved to be
a strong ‘counter-power’ to executive overreach during the state of emergency.
The web of controls surveyed by Granger lead him to the conclusion that while
‘ultimately the state of emergency does not operate outside the rule of law’, its
continuation over two years requires serious interrogation and has wide effect
on the French legal system even after its termination, resulting in a ‘lite’ state of
emergency that is restrictive of freedoms within the normal law.
In the first edition, we argued that any engagement with the question of
security and human rights would necessitate an engagement with the language
of risk. The modalities of security prevention over the past twelve years
have vindicated the predictions of authors in the first edition, most notably

44 For
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Lucia Zedner and Bernard Harcourt, who drew urgent attention to the capacity
for sophisticated risk technologies to legitimate pre-emptive intervention.
Undoubtedly, the relationship between human rights and security is integrally
bound up with what Shiri Krebs refers to in her chapter as ‘the epistemology of
risk’. There are few more iconic examples of the dominance of the technology and
discourse of risk over the counterterrorism terrain than targeted killing, and Kreb’s
chapter is a critical engagement with the modalities of risk-based decision-making
used in evaluating the potential collateral damage of targeted killing operations.
Focusing on the Israeli Special Investigatory Commission Report on the
collateral damage caused by the killing of Salah Shehadeh in 2002, Krebs highlights the fundamental vulnerabilities of the decision-making process regarding
such risks, as well as the challenges to public scrutiny of these decisions. Using
the concept of ‘bounded factuality’, Krebs shows how biases occur in the assessment of facts when applying international law safeguards (such as the principle
of precaution) to the use of lethal force. Through her analysis of the Shehadeh
Commission Report and associated primary documentation, Krebs concludes
that political oversight mechanisms are susceptible to the simplifications that
are inherent to national security narratives and therefore unlikely to bring such
complex biases to light. The Commission’s failure to explore whether intelligence errors constituted a violation of the IHL principles of proportionality and
precaution prompts her to formulate a set of proposals for going forward, based
on an acknowledgment of the limitations on legal fact-finding during conditions
of armed conflict.
The epistemology of risk is certainly not confined to the extreme case of
lethal force, as it can now be said to have transformed the criminal law and
criminal justice system.45 In his chapter, Andreas Armborst explores the recent
rise of programmes aimed at countering violent extremism within broader civil
society, arguing that these have been implemented to ‘creatively circumvent’
the structural limitations of the criminal justice system. Situating these prevention programmes alongside similar moves in a range of jurisdictions, Armborst
points to the European Programme Preventing Terrorism and Countering
Violent Extremism and Radicalization and the UN Plan of Action to Prevent
Violent Extremism as examples of a shift at the international level.46 He raises
concerns about the potential of the turn to ‘pre-prevention’ or ‘hyperpreventionalism’ to ‘securitise everything’, especially where programmes engage actors
within civil society beyond the traditional boundaries of the criminal justice
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and security sector. The German ‘Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote
Democracy’47 operates under the aegis of the Ministry for Family Affairs, and
like the UK Prevent programme, it engages NGOs, communities, and the education sector. Although these measures appear less coercive than those often
employed by criminal law and the police, they are not necessarily less intrusive
and indeed risk reifying the divisions they seek to address. Armborst concludes
by asking whether programmes aimed at countering violent extremism will be
moderated by the ‘approaches, mentalities, and professional skills’ of civic society actors tasked with their implementation, or whether such programmes will
result in a securitisation of these sectors.
Over-securitisation is also at the heart of the chapter by David Irvine and
Travers McLeod. Taking forced migration as their focus, Irvine and McLeod
argue that many of the problems associated with mass human displacement are
the result of insufficient resources being devoted to the processing and resettlement of refugees, poor co-ordination between countries, and inadequate
systems of identification. On this last point, Travers and McLeod argue that
while a ‘necessary condition for governments to attend effectively to these
issues is the ability to determine who is in their country’, existing approaches
to the identification and registration of forced migrants are in desperate need
of reform. Going further, they suggest that the problems of forced migration
are not the product of some irreconcilable conflict between security and human
right but rather a failure on the part of governments to take the challenges of
resettlement sufficiently seriously. Community cohesion, the maintenance of
security, and the protection of individual rights can all be achieved simultaneously, provided we are willing to provide refugees with sufficient opportunities
on arrival and devote adequate resources to ensuring their ‘successful absorption into the national fabric of settlement countries’.
V. CONCLUSION

When the first edition of this collection was published in 2007, many scholars were struggling with the question of whether it is possible to reconcile a
commitment to human rights with the demands of security in a post-9/11 world.
More than a decade later, this fundamental tension remains at the heart of many
discussions about the relationship between security and human rights. But in the
47 Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (Germany), ‘Strategy
to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy’ (adopted July 2016), available in English at https://
www.bmfsfj.de/blob/115448/cc142d640b37b7dd76e48b8fd9178cc5/strategie-der-bundesregierungzur-extremismuspraevention-und-demokratiefoerderung-englisch-data.pdf. See also BT Said and
H Fouad, ‘Countering Islamist Radicalisation in Germany: A Guide to Germany’s Growing Prevention
Infrastructure’, International Centre for Counter-terrorism (ICCT) Policy Brief (September 2018),
https://icct.nl/publication/countering-islamist-radicalization-in-germany-a-guide-to-germanysgrowing-prevention-infrastructure.
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twelve years that have passed since the first edition, we have also seen the
re-emergence of nationalism and xenophobia, a hardening of attitudes towards
migrants, and a dramatic increase in Islamophobia in populist security discourse.
Combined, these trends mean that the liberal order underpinning the international human rights framework since World War II is now under threat. For
those who seek to defend human rights and the idea that states must always, no
matter how serious the emergency, be committed to the rule of law, the challenge
is to make sense of these interconnected trends and to speak to the concerns
of those who see rights as nothing more than a hurdle to addressing real and
perceived problems of immigration, crime, and terrorism.
This will not be an easy task. While some of the most egregious attacks on
rights and the rule of law have either been repelled or rolled back by courts in
recent years, as many of the authors included in this collection note, politicians
around the world continue to play on insecurity and demand that fundamental
freedoms give way in the face of security threats. Moreover, the rise of rightwing populism and the revival of nationalistic rhetoric in democratic countries
suggest that the assault on human rights is becoming even more aggressive and
divisive.
There are, however, reasons to be optimistic about the future of rights and
the capacity of liberal constitutionalism to provide a brake on the worst excesses
of security populism. As many of the contributions in this volume demonstrate,
in the years since the first edition of Security and Human Rights was published,
both the academy and civil society have come to recognise that falling back on
conventional arguments and assumptions about rights will only take us so far.
Two shifts may be necessary in order to reinvigorate an effective defence of rights
in the face of security mandates. First, defenders of human rights must directly
and critically engage with emotive claims of insecurity and unrealistic promises of
security. Rather than reacting with similarly reductive narratives, we should seek
to develop a discourse of sober resilience – one that provides a serious account of
the risks to security while acknowledging both the inherent constraints on democratic states in achieving security and the wider security benefits to be gained
from protecting rights. Ultimately, this narrative will need to build on a recognition, even a celebration, of the risk that comes with a free society.
The second, related shift involves meaningful acknowledgment of the role
that liberalism has played in the historical and continued oppression of vulnerable groups. By addressing the ways in which the law in supposedly liberal
democracies has been co-opted in the name of security, we help to lay bare flaws
in the individualistic liberal vision of rights and the disconnect between abstract
claims of universality and lived experiences on the ground. This process of exposure should not be seen as a step towards the abandonment of the liberal human
rights project but rather as part of an attempt to revive it and make it relevant to
those who have, in Huq’s words, borne the ‘costs of security’.
The scope and variety of the chapters in this volume serve as a reminder that
though they are writ large, law and security are iterative – socially, politically,
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and even personally. If security populism (like terrorism) seeks to annihilate
difference,48 then to combat it we must recommit ourselves at every level to
the values that lie at the heart of human rights. As a touchstone for engaging
with difference, these values provide not only a means to bridge the divides that
security populists so often seek to exploit but also a set of shared personal and
political commitments that will help us to navigate the challenges to democracy
that the pursuit of security inevitably presents.
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